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FuTURE IN:rmmsTs-CoNTINGENT CoNsTRucnoN OF REMAINDER GIFT TO

CHAIUTY-Testator left property in trust to use the income, and such portions of
principal as might be necessary, for the support, maintenance and education of
his granddaughter during her life. Upon the death of the life tenant, the trustee
was directed "to pay unto the Methodist Protestant University of Kansas City,
Kansas, all the unexpended principal and interest thereof, if any, to have and to
hold the same forever.'' Subsequent to the testator's death in 1904, but prior to
the death of the life tenant, the remainderman assigned its interest to appellant's
assignor, and then went out of existence.1 In 1945 the life tenant died, and the
trustee sued to terminate the trust and ascertain the beneficiaries. The lower
court found an implied condition precedent that the beneficiary survive the life
tenant, and directed the trustees to pay to the residuary legatees. On appeal, held,
affirmed. Horton v. Board of Education of the Methodist Protestant Church,
(Wash. 1948) 201 P (2d) 163.
It is generally accepted that a gift to a named charity lapses if the charity is
not in existence when the gift takes elfect.2 The fundamental problem in such
cases is to discover when the gift takes effect, and this depends on whether it is

1 The remainderman continued a nominal existence, but for the purpose of this case,
the court treated it as nonexistent.
2 Fisk v. Attorney-General, 4 Eq. 521 (1867); In re Magrath, 2 Ch. 331 (1913); In re
Withall, 2 Ch. 236 (1932); In re Flathers' Estate, 157 Wash. 84, 288 P. 281 (1930); Gladding v. St. Mathews Church, 25 R.I. 628, 57 A. 860 (1904). The court in the principal case
Jinds no general charitable purpose, and hence does not feel the cy pres doctrine is applicable.
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vested or contingent Remainder estates are said be be vested if they are ready to
take effect in possession or enjoyment whenever and however the preceding estate
terminates, and contingent i~ possession and enjoyment are postponed until the happening of an express or implied condition precedent3 Since there is no express
language of condition in the principal case, the pertinent issue is_ whether
testator's will evidences an intent that the remainderman must survive the life
tenant to take. Where the testator does not clearly indicate his intent, courts
generally favor charities and early vesting,4 especially where there is no alternative gift. 5 The language _of the present will does not seem to justify a contingent
construction. The words "after her death" and "to pay unto" seem more appropriately described as referring to the time of payment than as iiidicating a
condition precedent of survivorship. 6 Of course, _if the gift is conditioned on the
occurrence of an event, a contingent construction is· indicated, 7 but the words
"if any" alone sh~uld not be held to make an otherwise vested gift contingent.
They probably indicate merely the presence of the power to invade the corpus,
and it is well settled that the presence of such a power does not affect the nature
of the remainder. 8 Though there seems to be little in the language of the principal case to suggest a condition precedent of survivorship, the court concludes
that the testator intended a contingent gift because the gift to charity was not
postponed solely to let in the life tenant. 9 Granted, as the court holds, that the
granddaughter was the preferred beneficiary, it does not follow that the gift to
charity was intended to be contingent unless the result be explained in terms of
the unsatisfactory "divide and pay over" rule. 10 Since the opposite conclusion

~

3 GRAY, RULE AcAINsT PERPEnnTIEs, 4th ed., p. 6 (1942); 1 SxMEs, Ftrrmra lNrEREsTs, c. 5 (1936).
4 Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253, 227 P. 6 (1924); Estate of Isenberg, 28 Hawaii
590 (1925); see generally 69 C.J., Wills, pp. 597-602 (1934); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§243, comi:µent (i) (1940).
5 Dickerson v. Morse, 200 Iowa 115, 202 N.W. 601 (1925); In re Valentine's Will,
119 Misc. 442, 196 N.Y.S. 398 (1922); In re Brown's Estate, 289 Pa. 101, 137 A. 132
(1927). A question may be raised as to the effect of Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington,
1932) §1404, which implies a reversion where there is no alternative gift over•
. 6 Belcher v. Phelps, 109 Conn. 7, 144 A. 659 (1929); see 2 SIMEs, FUTURB lNrnREsTs
§354, (1936); In re Hurd's Estate, 303 Mich. 504, 6 N.W. (2d) 758 (1942) (remainder not
divested by failure to survive the life tenant).
7 Bowles v. Denny, 155 Wash. 535, 285 P. 422 (1930).
8 In re Estate of Gochnour, 192 Wash. 92, 72 P. (2d) 1027 (1937); In re Ivy's
Estate, 4 Wash. ('2d) 1, 101 P. (2d) 1074 (1940); cf Moore v. Holbrook, 175 Va. 471,
9 S.E. (2d) 447 (1940).
9 If the remainder is postponed solely to let in a life tenant, the "divide and pay over"
rule does not render the gift contingent. See 69 C.J., Wills, §1721, n. 79.
1069 C.J., Wills, §1721, p. 628, lists substantial authority for the rule that the words
"pay to" indicate a contingent gift when no other words of gift are present, before or after
"pay _to." The exceptions to this rule are many. In re McQueen's Will, 99 Misc. 185, 163
N.Y.S. 287 (1917) (held rule inapplicable where no alternative gift over); Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N.Y. 183, 57 N.E. 312 (1900) (h.eld rule inapplicable where other words of gift
were present)~ Perhaps the words in the principal case, "to have and to hold the same for-
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as to the testator's intent could well be reached,11 the principal case illustrates
the manner in which this rule is sometimes invoked by courts to reach desired
results. Here, the desire to rule for the testator's relatives12 leads the court to
ascribe undue importance to the "pay to" and "if any" language, which was
probably intended only to define more clearly the trustee's duties and powers.
Charles D. Bell, S. Ed.

ever," could be construed as other words of gift. See 41 MICH. L. R:sv. 953 (1943) (noting
the unsatisfactory nature of the ,"divide and pay over" rule).
11 The testator was a trustee of the original remainderman and might well have
intended a presently vested and alienable gift over.
12 But to the effect that there are no presumptions in favor of heirs, see Hunt v.
Phillips, 34 Wash. 362, 75 P. 970 (1904).

